What is wrong with consumerism by Campbell, C. (Colin)
 Anuario Filosófico, XLIII/2 (2010), 279-296 279 
 
 
WHAT IS WRONG WITH CONSUMERISM? 
AN ASSESSMENT OF SOME COMMON CRITICISMS 
COLIN CAMPBELL 
 
 
Contemporary consumerism is frequently the target of criticisms 
by intellectuals, academics, religious spokesmen and commenta-
tors. Five of the more common of these criticisms are selected for 
analysis and examination; these being (a) the need criticism (b) the 
materialism criticism (c) the addiction criticism (d) the selfishness 
criticism, and (e) the irrationality criticism. Each is then shown 
either to be misconceived or to lack empirical support. Finally 
several of these common criticisms are shown to be at odds with 
each other. 
Keywords: consumerism, need, materialism, addiction, selfishness. 
 
El consumo contemporáneo es frecuentemente objeto de críticas 
por parte de intelectuales, académicos, líderes religiosos y comen-
taristas diversos. En este trabajo se analizan y examinan cinco de 
las críticas más comunes, como son: la crítica de la necesidad, la 
crítica sobre su materialismo, la crítica de la adicción, la crítica del 
egoísmo, y la crítica sobre su irracionalidad. Se muestra a con-
tinuación que todas ellas están desencaminadas o carecen de apo-
yo empírico. Finalmente, se pone de manifiesto que varias de estas 
críticas son incompatibles entre sí. 
Palabras clave: consumo, necesidad, materialismo, adicción, 
egoísmo. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Criticising, if not actually vilifying, modern consumerism, is 
now a widespread and commonplace feature of public comment 
and debate in contemporary Western societies, with ministers of 
religion, environmentalists, artistic and literary figures, and even 
left-wing politicians, all outspoken in their condemnation of this 
characteristic feature of modern life. And of course none have been 
more forceful in their condemnation that academics, for many of 
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whom consumerism now seems to occupy that special role, for-
merly held by capitalism, of constituting the fundamental and 
systemic source of all the ills of modern life1. Yet few of the criti-
cisms commonly levelled against consumerism, or more commonly 
against consumers and their behaviour, appear to be based on a 
careful study of the phenomenon in question. Rather it seems that 
its malign and undesirable nature is more often than not taken-for-
granted, an attitude that is then backed up by the repetition of 
certain common assumptions concerning both its nature and the 
motives than impel individuals to consume; assumptions that are 
not merely highly questionable, but frequently contradictory. It is 
thus the aim of this paper to subject a few of these common as-
sumptions to scrutiny and to try and show that, if they are not 
exactly false, then they are at least highly debatable.   
Those criticisms commonly levelled against the behaviour of 
contemporary consumers (and thus by implication against con-
sumerism itself) typically focus on the extent to which it is seen to 
stem from, or is regarded as stimulating or encouraging, unworthy 
motives (for example acquisitiveness, envy, greed, or the desire to 
impress), or as embodying undesirable values or traits (such as 
materialism or selfishness). Given that it is not possible to examine 
all these claims in one short article five are selected for discussion; 
these being (a) that modern consumerism typically involves 
individuals buying products that they do not need (b) that it 
embodies an undesirable materialism (c) that it should be con-
sidered a form of addiction (d) that is stems from selfishness, and 
lastly (e) that it is irrational and misguided in so far as it embodies 
the presumption that the acquisition of more and more goods is the 
path to happiness. 
 
__________________________ 
1. See, for just one example among many, Z. BAUMAN, Consuming Life 
(Polity, Cambridge, 2007). 
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2. THE NEED CRITICISM 
One of the more common criticism directed against modern 
consumerism is that it leads to people consuming more than they 
need. If only —the argument goes— individuals could restrict 
themselves just to buying only those things that they really “need”, 
instead of spending their money, and indeed frequently running 
into debt, buying those products and services that they want but 
cannot truly be said to need, then consumers would not only be 
more content in themselves but they would have the time and 
resources to devote to more fulfilling and worthwhile activities. 
Not only that of course but the human race would no longer be in 
danger of destroying the planet through the ever-increasing 
exploitation of its natural resources, while the resources that are 
still available could be shared more equitably between the haves 
and the have-nots.  
This is a very seductive and apparently self-evident argument; 
for it would seem incontrovertible that many of us in the developed 
world both purchase and possess products that we do not “really 
need” if only because we could easily live without the items in 
question. Indeed one reason this argument appears so plausible is 
because most of us did indeed manage to live without many of the 
items we now possess in the not-too-distant past (as of course did 
our parents and grandparents). While additional force is given to 
this claim by the fact that we often possess multiple items that 
effectively serve the same purpose (as in the notorious case, for 
example, of Imelda Marcos and her hundreds of pairs of shoes). 
Finally there is the fact that many consumers will readily confess, 
when questioned, that they possess items that they do not “really 
need”, a fact endorsed by their willingness to sell them on, donate 
them to charity, or otherwise dispose of them. Yet, despite this, the 
argument is not as clear-cut as it would seem. 
In the first place the fact that individuals possess items that they 
readily admit they do not need does not of course prove that need 
did not prompt the original purchase. It simply demonstrates that 
these items are no longer needed; not that they never were. In that 
respect it is merely an indictment of consumers for not disposing of 
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products quickly enough, that is as soon as they cease to be capable 
of satisfying the need that initially prompted their purchase. 
However the real problem with the criticism from need lies with 
the nature of that particularly troublesome four-letter word. Used 
as a noun it sounds definitive enough, and yet all efforts to specify 
given human needs, and especially to distinguish between real and 
false needs, have foundered. Indeed as Gardner and Shepherd 
rightly observe, the distinction between real and false needs, is “an 
impossible one to make”2. And yet, unless such a distinction can 
be made, that it is to say unless a common and definitive set of 
universal human needs can be identified, it is hard to see how one 
can criticise any individual or group for acquiring items that they 
do not need. 
Yet the real problem with the criticism that takes the concept of 
need as its basis is less this difficulty of specifying a set of 
universal human needs than the fact that the word “need” is really a 
verb and not a noun, and the problem with a verb is that it requires 
an object. Hence this criticism, when expressed in full, is that mo-
dern consumers do not really need all the goods they acquire or 
consume in order to do or achieve, realise or attain something or 
other. But then the critical question becomes what would that be 
exactly? What is it that consumers do not “need” these items to 
achieve? Is it perhaps in order to stay alive? Or in order to lead a 
comfortable existence? Or perhaps to lead “a good life”; or to be 
happy? Or perhaps the criticism is that consumers do not “need” all 
the items they consume to fulfill their potential as human beings; 
or in order to find meaning and purpose in their lives? What is it 
precisely that, according to this criticism, consumers do not need 
all these products in order to achieve, given that each of these 
answers would lead to a somewhat different specification of needs? 
This is the crucial question that requires an answer if this criticism 
of consumer behaviour is to have any force. Let us take the simple 
example of food. Most of us undoubtedly eat more than we “need” 
__________________________ 
2. C. GARDNER and J. SHEPHERD, Consuming Passions: The Rise of Retail 
Culture (Unwin Hyman, London, 1989), p. 48. 
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in order to stay alive. Indeed we probably eat much more than we 
need in order to be fit and healthy, as the rising obesity statistics 
would suggest. But then eating fulfils other functions other than 
simply supplying adequate nutrition or maintaining health. It also 
meets important social, psychological and cultural needs; ones that 
are a function of the nature of our society and its culture. Hence 
what we “need” to eat in order to be fit and healthy may be rather 
different to what we might “need” to eat to make us feel happy and 
contented, let alone what we would need to eat if we were to regu-
larly entertain friends and relatives in our homes, believe ourselves 
to be successful, or indeed attain our life-long ambition of being a 
gourmet. In this very obvious sense the concept of need is tied 
directly both to the purposes and goals of individuals as well as the 
values and beliefs of their culture. Consequently, and setting aside 
this specific example of food, it is simply not possible to assert 
what individuals or groups of people do or do not really “need” in 
the absence of a full understanding of their values, goals and life 
circumstances. Hence although one might want to claim that, in our 
society, people do not “need” to drive around in large, expensive 
and petrol-hungry cars, buy six pairs of shoes a year, or go on 
package holidays to Spain, these judgements are no more justified 
than the claim that people do not “need” to ride bicycles, buy the 
complete works of Shakespeare, or climb Everest. For the truth is 
that for anyone to attempt to specify what another person does or 
does not “need”, without a comprehensive knowledge of their 
background, personality, tastes, goals and ambitions, is simply to 
express a prejudice in favour of one specific conception of the 
good life.  
But then there is also the strange matter of the implicit prejudice 
against wants that the criticism from need implies. For the force of 
this argument necessarily rests on the assumption that while it is 
perfectly legitimate to satisfy one”s needs —whatever they might 
be deemed to be— it is illegitimate to satisfy one”s wants. But it is 
not clear on what basis this discrimination is justified, or why the 
satisfaction of desires should not be considered as just as legitimate 
as the gratification of needs. There is certainly plenty of evidence 
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to suggest that people are quite prepared to go without things that 
they could be said to “need” in order to have things that they 
“want”, and if this is indeed their preference on what grounds is it 
deemed appropriate to criticise them for it? The very real danger 
here is that, in elevating need over want and desire, one is likely to 
end up elevating the observer’s priorities over the subject’s; some-
thing that usually leads to the evaluation of utility over pleasure 
and hence to a form of neo-Puritanism3. The truth —however 
unpalatable this might be to the critics of consumerism— is that if 
one were to try and make a list of those needs that all human 
beings could be said to possess it would be necessary to include the 
need to want in the list; for we would not be human if we did not 
experience desire; and it would be a miserable life indeed if these 
desires were never satisfied. Indeed it is pertinent to point out that 
those simple-lifers and down-shifters who choose to abandon their 
city life and high-paid jobs for “the good life” in the countryside 
are actually indulging a want. They do not need to live like that. 
Or, to put it another way; in their efforts to reduce their wants they 
are in fact indulging their “want” for the simple life. It follows 
from the above that we are forced to the conclusion that one cannot 
successfully argue against excessive consumption on the basis of 
some claim concerning what it is that consumers do or do not 
“need”. For judgements of this kind are usually little more than 
expressions of personal prejudice, while any serious attempt to 
develop an argument along these lines will almost certainly lead to 
the endersing of traditionalistic, Puritanical and in all probability, 
authoritarian, attitudes.  
 
3. THE MATERIALISM CRITICISM 
A second criticism of modern consumer behaviour that is com-
monly encountered is that it is materialistic. That is to say it is 
judged to encourage consumers to attach an undue importance to 
material objects in their form as commodities; objects such as 
__________________________ 
3. See the argument in C. CAMPBELL, The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of 
Modern Consumerism (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1994). 
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clothes, jewellery, furnishings, houses, cars and the like, and hence 
to their acquisition, ownership and use. With the result that indi-
viduals come to value material objects, especially commodities, 
above all else; especially above such intangible goods as friend-
ship, community fellowship or love, and hence above their fellow 
human beings4. Once again, at first sight, this seems a plausible 
argument. However there are also real difficulties with this cri-
tique. The most obvious objection is the fact that today’s con-
sumers spend almost as much of their income on services as they 
do on goods; something that is hardly suggestive of materialism. 
Some of this is of course in order to obtain what are by today’s 
standards deemed essential services, such as gas, electricity, and 
water, together with telephone charges or internet connections, or 
indeed financial services, such as banking and insurance. To that 
extent such expenditure could be considered non-discretional and 
hence perhaps not typical of modern consumerism. But then this is 
not the area where services have expanded most rapidly in recent 
years, which has largely been in the field of personal services, 
together with entertainment. There has, for example, been a 
marked growth in the number of health spas, gyms, sports clubs, 
fitness and “wellness” centers, together with an increase in the 
number of practitioners of alternative and complementary med-
icine, all of which can be added to the many more traditional 
personal services, such as the hairdressers, masseuses and beau-
ticians, that make up this sector of the economy. Then, on top of 
this, all forms of entertainment have flourished, such as the cine-
ma, theatre, concerts and theme parks, together with a wide variety 
of sporting events. Yet it is hard to see how any of this could be 
said to indicate that consumers are guilty of placing an excessively 
high valuation on material objects.  
But there is another point that has to be made in connection 
with the general critique that people in contemporary society are 
too materialistic and it arises from the necessity of having to 
exclude works of artistic significance from such a claim. For in 
__________________________ 
4. See The Guardian (December 16, 1998).  
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condemning people for being too much in love with material 
objects, those who criticise modern consumerism presumably do 
not intend to include works of art under that heading. For then they 
would in effect be criticising people for queuing for hours to see 
the Mona Lisa, or driving miles to visit a stately home such as 
Chatsworth or indeed paying to see an exhibition of Monet’s 
paintings or visit a museum displaying the goods found in 
Tutankhamen’s tomb. Presumably the accusation of materialism is 
not meant to apply to this kind of activity, even though the objects 
that people are so keen on seeing are clearly material, while they 
are making a special effort —one that definitely involves the ex-
penditure— in order to see them. That this kind of activity is not 
generally viewed as evidence of materialism is presumably because 
the objects in question are considered to be distinctive and to have 
a claim to aesthetic, historic or scientific significance. In other 
words the accusation of materialism really means that people 
attach too much importance to the wrong kind of material objects. 
In addition, one assumes, to the fact that people also attach too 
much importance to possessing them, rather than simply appre-
ciating them from a distance. But then we should note that this 
latter accusation actually makes covetousness or acquisitiveness 
the accusation, not materialism.  
However the suggestion that the criticism that consumers are 
“materialistic” is only really meant to apply to commodities and 
not to works of artistic, aesthetic or historical significance 
presupposes that it relatively easy to make such a distinction. And 
yet a little reflection reveals that this is not a straightforward 
matter. One reason why such distinctions are difficult to make is 
because many, if not most, of those objects that today we tend to 
regard as works of art were originally created as commodities; that 
is objects made with the specific intention that they should be 
bought and sold in the marketplace, as indeed many still are; even 
if it is only art galleries, museums or the super-rich who can 
generally afford to buy them. But then it is equally true to say that 
many of those mass-produced commercial objects which are today 
offered for sale to the general public have a good claim to be 
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considered works of art; or at the least, objects of aesthetic 
significance. They can, after all, also be found in museums. The 
Design Museum in London, for example, contains objects that 
were designed and manufactured to be sold as commercial 
products, ones that have been specially selected because they are 
considered to be excellent examples of British design. In the spring 
of 2006 the Museum inaugurated the Great British Design Quest, 
in which the British public were invited to choose their favourite 
example of British design. What is significant is that many of the 
objects in the list were popular commercial products, such as Dr 
Marteens Air Wair Boot, for example, the Raleigh Chopper bike, 
the Mini car, the E-type Jaguar, and the Dyson DC01 vacuum 
cleaner5. Whilst one may not wish to think of these objects as 
works of art, and hence on a par with a Picasso painting or a Henry 
Moore sculpture, what is indisputable is that they are seen to 
possess aesthetic significance. What is more they are not recherché 
objects, bought only by the discerning few but ignored by the 
masses. These were popular, widely consumed, products. So 
presumably all those consumers who bought them when they were 
first on sale could just as easily be credited with aesthetic 
discernment as with a materialist obsession. But then what is 
important about this observation is that it is not just the occasional 
product which is offered for sale that could be considered to fall 
into this category. For what many of today’s consumers seem 
especially keen to purchase are those products which are generally 
known as “designer goods”; in other words ones that have not 
simply been manufactured to fulfil a function but which have also 
been crafted to give aesthetic satisfaction. This is especially 
obvious in the case of clothes, where the haute couturier has every 
right to be considered an artist, and although the clothes on sale in 
the high street are mass-produced modifications of the originals 
they nonetheless still bear the hallmarks of those creations, and 
hence still deserve to be thought of as objects of aesthetic 
distinction. But then if fashionable clothes are regarded in this way 
__________________________ 
5. See http:/www.britishdesigninovation.org/index.php?page=newsservice/ 
view&news_id=4516 
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one has to ask why their purchase by consumers cannot be seen as 
evidence of aesthetic discernment, rather than as an indication of 
materialism.  
 
4. THE ADDICTION CRITIQUE 
Noting the importance of fashion to the phenomenon of con-
sumerism connects with the third of the more common criticisms 
of consumer behaviour, which is that it is an addiction. This arises 
from the fact that one of the characteristic features of fashion 
—indeed one could say its defining feature— is the rapidity with 
which the aesthetic characteristics, or style, of modern commod-
ities, change. With the consequence that consumers themselves are 
continually buying new products, if only to stay “in fashion”. This 
has led many people to criticise contemporary consumer conduct 
on the grounds that people who could be considered to lead a 
reasonably comfortable life should be satisfied with what they 
have, and not continually seeking for yet more or better products or 
services. This is clearly closely linked to the argument, discussed 
earlier, which claims that people buy things they do not need, the 
difference here being that the emphasis is placed on insatiability 
and the compulsive nature of the associated behaviour. Consumers 
are criticised in this respect therefore for the fact that the 
acquisition of new goods is apparently “unsatisfying”, as they seem 
to lose interest in their new acquisitions remarkably quickly, 
rapidly transferring their desire to other new and as yet un-acquired 
products. Thus it is that commentators frequently come to the 
conclusion that such endless consuming of new goods is an essen-
tially empty and pointless exercise. That individuals continue to 
engage in this activity nonetheless is then explained by dubbing it 
“an addiction”; that is by suggesting that it is a form of compulsive 
behaviour in which the individuals concerned have become de-
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pendent in some way on the experience of either desiring or acqui-
ring products6. 
Once again this is an apparently plausible argument, especially 
as it is well known that there are indeed some people who can jus-
tifiably be said to be addicted to certain aspects of consumption. 
These individuals, generally dubbed spendaholics or shopaholics, 
do indeed display the classic systems of addiction7. Yet they 
constitute only a small minority of all consumers. If there is a sense 
in which the majority could also be said to be addicted then it 
would have to be with respect to the phenomenon of novelty, a 
quality that is necessarily destroyed in the very act of consumption, 
and consequently can only be re-experienced in another, subse-
quent act8. It is then the subsequent pattern of conduct, in which 
desire, acquisition and use is then immediately followed by further 
desire, acquisition and use, that is seen to warrant the label of 
addiction. However the key point here is that an emphasis on the 
experiential nature of consumption means that the consumption of 
goods in modern societies should be seen in precisely the same 
light as the consumption of mediated experiences. That is to say in 
the same manner as one understands the consumption of music, 
books, plays and films. Here too of course there is typically the 
same high turnover in products consumed, with some people going 
to the cinema two or three times a week (and not normally to see 
the same film a second or third time), buying new compact discs 
every week (or increasingly perhaps downloading new tunes), or 
indeed getting through up to four or five novels a month. However, 
it is not generally assumed that such individuals find each film they 
see or each tune they listen to, or each novel they read, to be 
__________________________ 
6. For an example of this kind of argument see G. REITH, Consumption and 
its discontents: addiction, identity and the problem of freedom, “British Journal of 
Sociology” 55 (2) (2004), 253-300. 
7. For material on spendaholics and shopaholics see A. L. BENSON, I Shop 
Therefore I am: Compulsive Buying and The Search for Self (Jason Aronson Inc, 
Northvale, 2000). 
8. For a development of this argument see C. CAMPBELL, The Romantic 
Ethic cit., chapter 5.  
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ultimately unsatisfying; so unsatisfying that they are then forced to 
go and find another one to watch, to listen to, or to read. Indeed, 
even though such practices display exactly the same desire for 
novelty as that which is typical of the consumption of material 
products they are not generally viewed as addictions. In which 
case, if indeed it is accepted as reasonable that an individual should 
repeatedly seek out and buy new films, new compact discs or 
novels, it is not clear why it should be seen as unreasonable when 
precisely the same novelty is sought for in the case of clothes, or 
indeed other commodities where fashion is a significant influence, 
such as furnishings, or interior décor generally. After all, the moti-
vation would appear to be essentially the same in both cases. Why 
then is it that the one form of behaviour is generally seen as accept-
able, while the other is subject to criticism?  
 
5. THE SELFISHNESS CRITIQUE  
So far doubt has been cast on the suggestion that consumers can 
be criticized for consuming what they do not need, for holding to 
materialist values, or being judged to be addicted to consuming, 
but nothing has been said about the claim that modern consum-
erism encourages selfishness9. In fact the suggestion that consum-
ers are motivated more by a desire for pleasurable experiences, 
rather than by a fetishistic obsession with commodities, would 
appear to strengthen rather than weaken the case for viewing 
modern consumerism as encouraging selfishness. But again per-
haps there are reasons to pause before lending support to this view. 
For it is simply not the case that most, let alone all, of modern 
consumer activity is undertaken in the interests of the self. It is not 
true for example of the majority of that form of shopping that we 
might call routine provisioning; that is the regular trip to the 
supermarket to buy groceries for the home. For this, as Daniel 
Miller’s research clearly shows, is commonly undertaken by indi-
__________________________ 
9. The former pope, in a special message of World Peace issued in January 
1998, claimed that consumerism represented “the selfish satisfaction of personal 
aspirations”. (See The Guardian, December 16 1998.) 
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viduals (usually housewives) who are concerned with “the moral 
economy of the home”10, and whose activity is best understood as 
expressive of the love they feel for their family11. But then it is not 
merely women in their role as housewives (or indeed men acting as 
househusbands) whose consumption activity can be regarded as 
unselfish in the sense that it is directed at meeting the needs of 
others rather than themselves. Gift-giving in all its forms consti-
tutes the impetus for a considerable part of the shopping that lies at 
the centre of modern consumerism. Indeed it is worth asking how 
companies like Interflora or Hallmark could survive if thousands 
of people didn’t regularly send flowers or cards to lovers, friends 
or family. While we can hardly overlook that vast orgy of spending 
that occurs just before Christmas; virtually all which involves 
buying commodities that will be given away. Activity which is 
rather at odds with the suggestion that consumerism necessarily 
supports selfishness.  
But the real problem with this critique is that in one sense it 
approximates to a tautology to claim that consumerism encourages 
selfishness. For generally speaking we can define “consumer 
goods” as ones that are manufactured and sold in order to satisfy 
personal needs. Indeed the original definition of the verb “to 
consume” meant to eat or drink, and in matters of a straightforward 
gustatory nature no-one but the consumer in is a position to judge 
whether the items in question are to his or her “taste” or not. In 
other words the self is necessarily the final arbiter in such matters. 
Looked at in this light it is hard to see how consumption could 
really be anything else but an exercise in satisfying the self. What 
therefore one suspects that this critique is really addressing is not 
so much the nature of modern consumer behaviour, but rather the 
extent to which behaviour of this kind has come to displace other 
__________________________ 
10. D. MILLER, A Theory of Shopping (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998), 
p. 35. 
11. It is important to note that much consumption may well be “other-
directed” without however conforming to the Veblenesque model of being 
undertaken with the intention of impressing others. Rather it could be said to be 
“other-directed” in the sense that it is undertaken for the direct benefit of others. 
COLIN CAMPBELL 
292 
forms of personal conduct and social interaction. With the 
consequence that satisfying the self (or “selfishness”) can be seen 
as the dominant activity in contemporary developed Western 
societies. This seems to be the only way in which this critique can 
be considered to make sense, the real objection against consum-
erism being that it has been allowed to invade areas of life were it 
has no right to be. Specifically that consumerism has increasingly 
come to replace the ideals of professionalism, public service and 
citizenship. Whether the responsibility for this development should 
be placed on consumers themselves, rather than on the shoulders of 
politicians, is debatable.  
 
6. THE HAPPINESS CRITIQUE 
The last critique to be considered is that which asserts that 
individuals erroneously perceive the acquisition of more and more 
goods as the path to happiness. In other words individuals are 
criticized for making the acquisition and use of commodities the 
over-riding goal in life in the mistaken belief that this is the path to 
true happiness, or —as some have expressed it— that “the good 
life” is made up of “the goods life”. In one respect this claim is no 
more than the old adage to the effect that one can’t “buy” happi-
ness. However this has been given a new lease of life, and appar-
ently empirical support, in recent years from what has been 
described as “the emerging science of subjective well-being”12. 
Here the key finding appears to be that once one is beyond some 
minimum threshold individual estimations of happiness do not 
increase as absolute levels of consumption of material goods rise13. 
A conclusion that is then drawn from this is that for anyone other 
than the truly poor and deprived devoting one’s time and effort to 
the acquisition of more and more goods is a futile waste of time. 
However there are some important qualifications that need to be 
__________________________ 
12. See D. BOUNDY, When Money Is the Drug, in A. L. BENSON, (ed.) I 
Shop Therefore I am, cit., pp. 3-26. 
13. See M. EID and R. J. LARSEN (eds.), The Science of Subjective Well-
Being (The Guilford Press, London, 2007). 
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noted about this research. The first one to note is that the same 
research does show quite clearly that happiness does indeed rise as 
extra expenditure rises if it is spent on such “non-tangible” goods 
such as exercise, holidays or entertaining. But, as we have already 
had cause to note, expenditure on these items has indeed been 
rising rapidly, so perhaps consumers do know what they are doing 
after all. Also, within any one society research clearly shows that 
the rich are happier than the poor, so it is not in fact irrational for 
people to strive for riches. But then this research —and hence the 
critique based on its findings— can be criticised for focusing on 
the question of happiness in the first place. For not only is this an 
extraordinarily elusive state (one not easily amenable to measure-
ment), but it is not clear that this is the goal that most consumers 
are attempting to reach through their consumption activities.  
For, as the earlier discussion of the addiction critique suggests, 
consumers may be more concerned with pleasure than happiness, 
and although one might wish to claim (as indeed some philos-
ophers have done) that there is a close connection between the two, 
they are clearly not identical states. Certainly the evidence would 
seem to suggest that the young in particular are searching for 
excitement rather than happiness, as is suggested by their interest 
in computer games, dangerous sports, gambling, adventure holi-
days and fast cars. For other consumers, especially perhaps the 
elderly, the pertinent goals may be health, security, or peace of 
mind. All of which are products that can indeed be bought in the 
market-place (in the form, for example, of private health care, 
burglar alarms or insurance). But then there is also the possibility, 
as suggested in some theories of consumer behaviour, that what 
individuals seek to obtain through their consuming is meaning, in 
the form of the construction or confirmation of identity. All of 
which does rather suggest that it is perfectly sensible for consumers 
to assume, as it would appear they do, that many significant life-
goals can indeed be bought, even if that especially elusive state 
called “happiness” does remain tantalisingly just out-of-reach.  
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7. CRITICISMS IN CONTRADICTION 
The above discussion has focused on exposing both the logical 
weaknesses and lack of empirical support for some of the more 
common criticisms of consumerism and consumer behaviour. But 
there is another point that needs to be made concerning these criti-
cisms, and it relates to their mainly contradictory nature. For the 
problem with many a generalised critique of contemporary con-
sumerism is that it frequently involves combining several of the 
individual criticisms mentioned above without the critic apparently 
being aware of their contradictory status. For example, the claim 
that consumers are materialistic, discussed earlier, is sometimes 
combined with another popular thesis concerning consumer behav-
iour, one that derives from Veblen’s theory of conspicuous con-
sumption, which is the suggestion that people consume in order to 
enhance their perceived social status, or in popular parlance, to 
“keep up with the Joneses”. However if it assumed that what 
consumers are doing is purchasing expensive items not primarily 
because of the qualities that these products possess but rather 
because of the message their possession enables them to send to 
others then it follows that consumers value the esteem of others 
above the material objects they use as a means to that end. Hence 
one would be forced to conclude that they are not really 
materialistic, for otherwise they would value the commodities 
themselves above all else, including the good opinion of their 
fellow consumers. In fact the contradiction identified here is but a 
special case of a larger conflict between those theories of consumer 
behaviour which stress the value placed on commodities because 
of what they can “do” and what they can “say”. Thus consumers 
cannot be both materialistic and engaged in identity-construction 
for example. Equally they cannot be both engaged in buying 
products that they don’t need and addicted to novelty, since the 
acquisition of an endless series of “new” products is necessary in 
order to feed their “addiction”. Hence the problem with many con-
temporary critiques of consumerism is not simply that they 
embody criticisms that are not valid in themselves; it is also that 
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their employment in combination means that they also frequently 
negate each other.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
It is not the purpose of this discussion to imply that there are no 
valid criticisms that can be made of modern consumerism. Rather 
the focus has been on the inadequate nature of some of the more 
common criticisms leveled against consumers themselves. If by 
contrast the focus is shifted to the larger system within which 
individuals engage in consumer behaviour, and specifically per-
haps to the cumulative effect of their conduct, then it becomes 
somewhat easier to see how valid criticisms might be constructed. 
In other words the focus needs to shift from the supposed motives 
that impel individuals to consume, as well as the values it is 
assumed guide such behaviour, to the consequences of the behav-
iour itself. These can then be judged against generally agreed 
social or environmental objectives, such as tackling climate 
change, husbanding the world’s natural resources, or combating 
poverty. Thus, to take but one example, one could then claim, not 
that individual consumers are acquiring products that they don’t 
“need”, but that certain categories of individual are consuming 
excessively as judged by the level needed to prevent others from 
being deprived of similar opportunities. These others may either be 
people alive today who are not lucky enough to have similar 
opportunities to consume, or they could be generations as yet 
unborn. Looked at in this light it becomes acceptable to ask 
individuals and families to re-examine their consumption habits 
and see if they can adjust their practices to help address these 
collective problems. But arguing that there is a real societal or 
environmental need for consumers to modify their consumption 
habits is quite different from claiming that, as individuals, they are 
consuming things that they do not need, or consuming them for the 
wrong reasons.  
The main reason for writing this paper is encourage a more 
careful and nuanced criticism of consumerism, one that is more in 
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tune with the empirical evidence. Because unfortunately there are 
reasons to believe that, as suggested in the introduction, contempo-
rary consumerism is often the subject of unjustified condemnation 
by intellectuals and academics, a condemnation that would appear 
to have its roots in unacknowledged yet deep-seated prejudice 
rather than any study of the reality in question; which of course 
then raises the interesting question of the possible source of this 
prejudice. Perhaps it should be seen as stemming from the long-
standing haute bourgeois critique of the nouveau riches for their 
obsession with wealth and status-enhancing possessions; or possi-
bly it is merely the latest form of the traditional middle-class 
critique of the working classes for their tendency to indulge in 
instant gratification. It could even arise from the intellectual’s 
distaste for mass society, or the traditional bohemian contempt for 
the bourgeois preoccupation with those material aids that help 
ensure a comfortable life. Whatever its origins this prejudice 
against consumption and the trappings of a consumer society must 
seem like the cruellest of jokes to the impoverished millions of 
Africa, Asia and South America. Not to mention the struggling 
poor of Eastern Europe and the hundreds of thousands who make 
up the under-classes of Western Europe and North America.  
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